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Abstract:  21 
The exposure of critical infrastructure to natural and human-induced hazards has severe consequences on world 22 
economies and societies. Therefore, resilience assessment of infrastructure assets to extreme events and 23 
sequences of diverse hazards is of paramount importance for maintaining their functionality. Yet, the resilience 24 
assessment commonly assumes single hazards and ignores alternative approaches and decisions in the 25 
restoration strategy. It has now been established that infrastructure owners and operators consider different 26 
factors in their restoration strategies depending on the available resources and their priorities, the importance of 27 
the asset and the level of damage. Currently, no integrated framework that accounts for the nature and sequence 28 
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of multiple hazards and their impacts, the different strategies of restoration, and hence the quantification of 29 
resilience in that respect exists and this is an acknowledged gap that needs urgently filling. This paper provides, 30 
for the first time in the literature, a classification of multiple hazard sequences considering their nature and 31 
impacts. Subsequently, a novel framework for the quantitative resilience assessment of critical infrastructure, 32 
subjected to multiple hazards is proposed, considering the vulnerability of the assets to hazard actions, and the 33 
rapidity of the damage recovery, including the temporal variability of the hazards. The study puts forward a 34 
well-informed asset resilience index, which accounts for the full, partial or no restoration of asset damage 35 
between the subsequent hazard occurrences. The proposed framework is then applied on a typical highway 36 
bridge, which is exposed to realistic multiple hazard scenarios, considering pragmatic restoration strategies. The 37 
case study concludes that there is a significant effect of the occurrence time of the second hazard on the 38 
resilience index and a considerable error when using simple superimposition of resilience indices from different 39 
hazards, even when they are independent in terms of occurrence. This potentially concerns all critical 40 
infrastructure assets and, hence, this paper provides useful insights for the resilience-based design and 41 
management of infrastructure throughout their lifetime, leading to cost savings and improved services. The 42 
paper concludes with a demonstration of the importance of the framework and how this can be utilised to 43 
estimate the resilience of networks to provide a quantification of the resilience at a regional and country scale. 44 
Keywords: resilience, critical infrastructure, environment, multi-hazard, fragility, vulnerability, restoration 45 
1. Introduction 46 
The exposure of critical infrastructure to natural hazards such as floods, earthquakes, tsunami, landslides, 47 
hurricanes, wildfires or extreme temperatures was proven to have severe consequences on world economies and 48 
societies (Pescaroli and Alexander, 2016). For example, the heavy 2007 rainfall in the UK affected the road 49 
network, with the cost estimated at £60m, while during the 2009 floods in Cumbria, UK, at least 20 bridges had 50 
collapsed or damaged, causing one fatality, £34m of restoration costs and great societal impact (Cumbria County 51 
Council, 2010). Among the critical threats to infrastructure around the world, scour is recognised as the most 52 
common cause of bridge failure (Kirby et al., 2015). The direct and indirect economic losses due to landslides 53 
affecting road networks are of similar magnitude (Winter et al., 2016). The effects of natural hazards may be 54 
Accepted manuscript: Argyroudis SA, Mitoulis SA, Hofer L, Zanini MA, Tubaldi E, Frangopol DM (2020). Resilience assessment 
framework for critical infrastructure in a multi-hazard environment. Science of the Total Environment, 714, 136854. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.136854         3  
exacerbated due to climate change that causes more frequent and intense extreme weather and climatic events 55 
(Stern et al., 2013; Draper et al., 2015; Pant et al., 2018; Sarkodie and Strezov, 2019). Furthermore, 56 
infrastructure assets are exposed to multiple hazards and/or cascading effects, such as flood series over time, 57 
flood-earthquake, earthquake-induced tsunami, landslides and liquefaction, rainfall-induced landslides or 58 
earthquake-aftershock events (Akiyama et al., 2019). A well-known example of the importance of multiple 59 
hazard effects is the 2011 Tohoku, Japan earthquake and resulting tsunami. During this extreme event, the 60 
country rail and highway networks were both strongly affected, and in total 23 stations were washed away, 61 
tracks and bridge piers were either eroded or buried, passenger and freight trains were derailed (Krausmann and 62 
Cruz, 2013). During the destructive hurricanes Katrina in 2005 and Sandy in 2012 in the US, several structures 63 
were damaged due to combined wave forces and debris impact (Padgett et al., 2008). Rainfall-induced landslides 64 
are one of the most critical geohazards in the world (Zhang et al., 2019) and earthquake-induced landslides are 65 
equally detrimental. The 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China triggered more than 15000 landslides, caused 66 
more than 20,000 deaths and the cut-off of many towns, due to the extensive damage to highways (Tang et al., 67 
2011). More recently, a bridge had collapsed due to flood in Italy, an area with high seismicity (Scozzese et al., 68 
2019).  69 
Infrastructure owners and operators are increasingly faced with the challenge of delivering resilient 70 
infrastructure and mitigating the effects of multiple hazards and climate change effects. In particular, resilience 71 
describes the emergent property or attributes that infrastructure has, which allows them to withstand, respond 72 
and/or adapt to a vast range of disruptive events, by maintaining and/or enhancing their functionality (Woods, 73 
2015). The term is used widely over many different fields of research, but quantitative metrics of the resilience 74 
of socio-technical systems are not well established and standards and processes are still emerging (Lloyd’s 75 
Register Foundation, 2015). The concept of resilient cities and infrastructure for disaster management has 76 
nowadays received more attention, and the existing approaches are mainly based on qualitative methods and 77 
index systems (Rockefeller Foundation, 2014; Rus et al., 2018). Moreover, the risk approaches for multi-hazard 78 
assessment and management of ecosystems (Furlan et al., 2018; Robinne et al., 2018), communities (Moghadas 79 
2019; Sajjad and Chan 2019) and critical infrastructure (Giannopoulos et al., 2012; Komendantova et al., 2014; 80 
Theocaridou and Giannopoulos, 2015; Chen et al., 2019) are generally qualitative, or quantitative (e.g. Decò 81 
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and Frangopol, 2011). Life-cycle design and assessment methodologies of infrastructure under multiple hazards 82 
are discussed by Yang and Frangopol (2018) and Akiyama et al. (2019). Also, the hazard interactions and 83 
cascading effects can be classified differently, while modelling of multiple hazards has not been established or 84 
agreed internationally yet (Gill and Malamud, 2014; Zaghi et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016; Bruneau et al., 2017).  85 
Resilience-based assessment and management are recent philosophies that are gradually being adopted in 86 
practical applications of critical infrastructure and are expected to be incorporated in the next generation of 87 
provisions and guidelines, e.g. see REDi system by Almufti and Willford (2013). However, the shift to 88 
resilience-based management should include specific methods to define and measure resilience, new modelling 89 
and simulation techniques for highly complex and interacting systems, development of resilience engineering 90 
and approaches for communication with stakeholders (Linkov et al., 2014). In this context, different frameworks 91 
and assessment tools have been proposed in the literature to assess resilience under individual or multiple 92 
hazards, at (a) asset level, (b) infrastructure network level, and (c) community or national scale (Table 1). The 93 
resilience metrics and criteria are commonly dealing with descriptive and qualitative analysis. Recently, Kong 94 
and Simonovic (2019) assessed multiple hazard spatiotemporal resilience of interdependent infrastructure 95 
systems using network theory and statistical analysis. Quantitative resilience metrics usually measure the quality 96 
or performance of the asset or system before and after the event, and the recovery rate (Hosseini et al., 2016). 97 
Resilience measures can be either static or time-dependent, and in some cases, stochastic approaches are enabled 98 
to account for the aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties (Frangopol and Bocchini, 2011; Ouyang et al., 2012; 99 
Decò et al., 2013). The majority of the abovementioned frameworks generally encompass the principles of 100 
resilience or the 4R’s, as per Bruneau et al. (2003): 1) Robustness, describing the inherent strength or resistance 101 
of a system to withstand external demands, e.g. hazard actions, without degradation or loss of functionality; 2) 102 
Redundancy (Zhu and Frangopol, 2012), reflecting the system properties that allow for alternate options, choices 103 
and substitutions under stresses; 3) Resourcefulness, expressing the capacity to mobilise needed resources and 104 
services under emergency conditions, and 4) Rapidity, defining the speed at which disruption can be overcome. 105 
  106 
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Table 1. Indicative literature on resilience assessment frameworks and assessment tools under individual or multiple 107 
hazards 108 
Level of analysis Reference 
asset  Bridges: Bocchini and Frangopol (2012b), Bocchini et al. (2014), Dong and Frangopol (2015). Tunnels: Huang and Zhang (2016) 
infrastructure network 
Transport systems: Saydam et al., (2013), Bocchini and Frangopol (2012a), 
Hughes and Healy (2014), Chan and Schofer (2015), Kiel et al. (2016). 
Water systems: Mensah and Dueñas-Osorio (2015), Wang et al. (2019). 
Energy networks: Cimellaro et al. (2015). Airports: Faturechi et al. (2014). 
Interconnected networks: Fotouhi et al. (2017), Kong and Simonovic (2019) 
community-country Bruneau et al. (2003), Cimellaro et al. (2016), Matthews et al. (2014), Ayyub (2014), Franchin (2018), Zhang et al. (2019) 
resilience metrics and criteria Gay and Sinha (2013), Ouyang and Wang (2015), Mebarki et al. (2016), Hosseini et al. (2016) 
 109 
The robustness to hazard actions is usually quantified through fragility functions, which give the probability of 110 
the asset exceeding defined limit states, e.g. serviceability and ultimate, for a given hazard intensity, e.g. peak 111 
ground acceleration for earthquakes, water discharge or scour depth for floods or ground displacement for 112 
liquefaction and landslides. Fragility functions can be derived from empirical, analytical, expert elicitation and 113 
hybrid approaches (Argyroudis et al., 2019; Silva et al., 2019). An overview of the available fragility functions 114 
for critical infrastructure subjected to earthquakes is given by Pitilakis et al. (2014), while HAZUS-MH (2011) 115 
methodology provides fragility functions and loss models for buildings and infrastructure in the US, exposed to 116 
earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes and floods. Bridges are key assets of the transport infrastructure, and the 117 
available fragility models for earthquakes and other hazards are discussed by Tsionis and Fardis (2014), Billah 118 
and Alam (2015), Gidaris et al. (2017) and Stefanidou and Kappos (2019), while fragility functions for other 119 
transport assets are summarised by Argyroudis and Kaynia (2014) and Argyroudis et al. (2019). The fragility 120 
of other assets exposed to hazards other than earthquakes are limited and sparse, including for example electric 121 
power transmission lines and towers exposed to wind (Panteli et al., 2017), industrial plants and tanks subjected 122 
to tsunami (Mebarki et al., 2016) or critical infrastructure under volcanic hazards (Wilson et al., 2017). Few 123 
fragility models for multiple hazards are available as summarised in Section 2. Hence, despite the increase of 124 
research efforts on the vulnerability of critical infrastructure against natural, environmental and human-induced 125 
hazards, there is still a lack of systematic vulnerability assessment against multiple hazards, considering also 126 
the effects of deterioration, e.g. ageing, and mitigation measures, e.g. retrofitting, in the fragility response. 127 
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The rapidity of the recovery after disruption due to a hazard event is expressed through restoration functions 128 
for the infrastructure assets. The available restoration models correlate the recovery time with the functionality 129 
reached for a given damage level, e.g. Gidaris et al. (2017) for bridges, Galbusera et al. (2018) for port facilities, 130 
Castillo et al. (2014) for electric power systems, Luna et al., (2011) for water distribution systems and HAZUS-131 
MH (2011) for various infrastructure assets. They are typically based on expert judgments, following a linear, 132 
e.g. Bocchini and Frangopol (2012b), stepwise formulation, e.g. Padgett and DesRoches (2007) or normal 133 
distribution, e.g. HAZUS-MH (2011). The development of reliable restoration models is a challenge because 134 
the recovery time depends on the available resources and practices of the owner, the type of hazard and the 135 
extent of the damage. Furthermore, the functionality and restoration time of assets with multiple components, 136 
for example, bridges, is dependent on the damage of the sub-components, e.g. bearings, piers, deck, abutments, 137 
foundation. This includes different restoration tasks and uncertainties and, therefore, a probabilistic approach is 138 
more appropriate. For example, Decò et al. (2013) proposed a probabilistic evaluation of seismic resilience of 139 
bridges, accounting for the uncertainties in the recovery pattern, i.e. residual functionality, idle time, duration 140 
of recovery and target functionality, as a support tool for decision making within the bridge life-cycle. The 141 
restoration times for the different tasks and components can vary considerably, while a range of values or a 142 
mean value and a standard deviation can describe the expected recovery time (Bradley et al., 2010; Karamlou 143 
and Bocchini, 2017). In general, the restoration models are mainly available for earthquake-induced hazards, 144 
while little information for other hazards is provided, e.g. by HAZUS-MH (2011) for tsunami. 145 
Important gaps in current resilience assessment frameworks for infrastructure assets is that they consider only 146 
single hazards and one occurrence of the hazard. A more reliable assessment of the vulnerability, risk and 147 
resilience of critical infrastructure should consider the occurrence of multiple hazard events, potentially of 148 
different natures including their temporal variability during the lifetime of the asset as well as the asset 149 
deterioration and/or improvement. The development of methods for lifetime resilience assessment (Yang and 150 
Frangopol, 2018) is an urgent need of paramount importance for infrastructure owners and operators, to enhance 151 
safety, leading to significant cost savings and efficient allocation of resources toward resilient infrastructure.  152 
This study aims at filling this urgent knowledge gap by (1) providing a sound classification of multiple hazards 153 
affecting critical infrastructure, (2) reviewing existing approaches and techniques for dealing with the effect of 154 
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multiple hazards in the infrastructure resilience assessment, and (3) developing and applying a resilience 155 
assessment framework for critical infrastructure assets exposed to a sequence of individual and/or multiple 156 
natural, environmental and human-induced hazard events. This framework considers the factors that reflect 157 
redundancy and resourcefulness in infrastructure, i.e. (i) the robustness to hazard actions, based on realistic 158 
fragility functions, and (ii) the rapidity of the recovery after the occurrence of different levels of direct damage 159 
and induced consequences, based on realistic restoration and reinstatement functions respectively, enabling 160 
adjustments to the time of initiation of restoration after the hazard event (idle time), the type of the restoration 161 
actions and the sequence of hazards. In Section 2 below, a classification of multiple hazards is given, by also 162 
including relevant examples from real systems subjected to hazard sequences. Subsequently, the proposed 163 
conceptual framework for resilience assessment is described. The output of the framework is a resilience index, 164 
which is a function of the time-variant functionality of the infrastructure over the restoration time for the hazard 165 
scenarios. In Section 3, an application of the proposed framework is given by analysing the resilience of a typical 166 
highway bridge under two realistic multi-hazard scenarios, both involving the occurrence of a flood and an 167 
earthquake event. In the first scenario, it is assumed that the bridge is fully restored after the occurrence of the 168 
flood event and before the earthquake strikes the bridge. For the second scenario, the earthquake is assumed to 169 
occur during the restoration process following the occurrence of the flood. The results of the resilience 170 
assessments for the two cases are presented and discussed in Section 4. The proposed framework and application 171 
contribute to the enhancement of current practices for resilience-based management of infrastructure assets by 172 
shifting toward the multi-hazard lifetime resilience assessment. The paper concludes with a demonstration of 173 
the importance of the framework and how this can be utilised to estimate the resilience of networks to provide 174 
a quantification of the resilience at a regional and country scale. 175 
2. Resilience assessment framework for infrastructure exposed to multi-hazard 176 
This section describes the proposed resilience framework for infrastructure assets exposed to multiple hazards. 177 
It is recognised that due to the diversity of infrastructure assets and the diversity of hazards and combinations, 178 
it will only be realistic if a number of critical scenarios are described, yet, an effort was given for the framework 179 
to be holistic and representative for a wide range of critical infrastructure. Section 2.1 introduces a classification 180 
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of multiple hazards for critical infrastructure and Section 2.2 describes the proposed framework specifically 181 
addressing a sequence of hazards in the resilience assessment. 182 
2.1 Classification of multiple hazards for critical infrastructure  183 
Multiple hazards are classified into three categories. Where appropriate, to simplify the discussion the case of 184 
two hazards (Haz-1 and Haz-2) is considered, for which different interaction scenarios are analysed. This 185 
classification includes terminology from previous studies, i.e. Gill and Malamud (2014); Bruneau et al. (2017), 186 
but also includes the nature of the hazards and introduces the temporal variability of hazard occurrences and 187 
restoration measures. 188 
(I) Independent hazards of different impacts, including for example floods caused by different weather 189 
phenomena, flood preceding an earthquake or the opposite. The time between the occurrences of the two 190 
hazards, their sequence and their intensities can vary considerably. Therefore, depending on the loss of 191 
functionality, which defines the residual capacity of the infrastructure asset, the restoration can commence 192 
immediately after Haz-1, e.g. a flood, and can be completed before the initiation of the second hazard, e.g. 193 
earthquake (Figure 1, left), or the functionality loss due to Haz-1 is not recovered, e.g. the owner does not act 194 
or not aware of the loss, until the occurrence of Haz-2, after which the restoration commences (Figure 1, right). 195 
Due to the different nature of the hazards, restoration of the damage due to Haz-1, e.g. hydraulic actions, is not 196 
necessarily expected to improve the performance against the second hazard, e.g. earthquake. This is a key factor 197 
for the resilience-based management for independent hazards and will influence decisions both in retrofitting 198 
and restoration schemes, either before or after the hazard incident. Figure 1 (left) represents the expected and 199 
desirable strategy of the owner. However, Figure 1 (right), are also said to be realistic scenarios, on the basis of 200 
limited resources and, hence, reduced or no reactivity and/or proactivity.  201 
Ecosystems are exposed to more than one hazard, and hence, it is likely that critical infrastructure located in 202 
such areas will experience multiple hazards in their lifetime. There are several examples of non-concurrent and 203 
independent multiple hazards that caused extensive damage to infrastructure, e.g. in China, the USA, Japan and 204 
Europe (Ayyub, 2014; Chang, 2016). Moreover, there are several studies investigating the effect of independent 205 
hazards in case of bridges, as for example scour followed by earthquake (Banerjee and Prasad, 2013; Dong et 206 
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al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014; Yilmaz et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2016), barge collision and scour (Kameshwar and 207 
Padgett, 2018), or earthquake and hurricanes (Kameshwar and Padgett, 2014). Few studies are also available 208 
for the risk and resilience assessment of distributed infrastructure exposed to multiple independent hazards, such 209 
as for electric power networks under seismic and hurricane hazards by Salman and Li (2018) and road networks 210 
under floods, earthquakes and human-induced disasters by Faturechi and Miller-Hooks (2014). 211 
 212 
Figure 1. Restoration strategies for a sequence of independent hazards with damage restoration after the occurrence of 213 
the first hazard (left) or with partial (dashed line) or no (continuous line) damage restoration after Haz-1 (right). 214 
(II) Correlated or cascading hazards, where the secondary hazard (Haz-2) is triggered by the primary hazard 215 
(Haz-1), including, for example, liquefaction, landslide, tsunami and fire triggered by earthquakes, or flood, 216 
landslides, extreme wind and debris flow triggered by a hurricane. In this case, the two hazards are concurrent 217 
(Figure 2, right) or successive within a short period of time (Figure 2, left). Therefore, the functionality drops 218 
due to Haz-1 (solid vertical line in Figure 2) and drops further due to Haz-2 (dashed line in Figure 2) without 219 
any restoration taking place after the occurrence of Haz-1. For example, restoration strategies for a bridge 220 
constructed in an earthquake-prone area should predict the occurrence of the cascading landslide in a 221 
mountainous environment or liquefaction in loose saturated granular soils, both triggered by the ground motion. 222 
Another example is the loss of functionality of a bridge due to strong winds during a hurricane, followed by an 223 
extensive flood in a short period of time.  224 
Such types of cascading hazards have been extensively observed in past events, including the widespread 225 
damage to transport infrastructure due to liquefaction and landslides after the 2007 Niigata – ken Chuetsu Oki 226 
earthquake in Japan (Kayen et al., 2009) or the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China (Tang et al., 2011). The 227 
effects of cascading hazards to infrastructure performance have been studied by Brandenberg et al. (2011) and 228 
Aygün et al. (2011) for bridges exposed to liquefaction caused by earthquake shaking, and by Omidvar and Kivi 229 
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(2016) for gas pipelines under earthquake, liquefaction and fire following the earthquake. Hackl et al. (2018) 230 
and Lam et al., (2018) estimated the impact of rainfall-induced floods and mudflows on a road network 231 
considering the associated risks to bridges and pavements, including physical damage and functional loss. 232 
   233 
Figure 2. Cascading hazards, where the second (Haz-2) is triggered by the first hazard (Haz-1) simultaneously (right) or 234 
within a short period (left) and the restoration commences after the completion of the multiple hazard sequence. 235 
(III) Correlated or independent hazards of the same nature that may have cumulative effects on the 236 
structure. Some examples in this category are, e.g. main-shock and aftershocks, or multiple mainshock events 237 
occurring during the lifetime of a structure or multiple floods, resulting in scour accumulation at bridge 238 
foundations (Tubaldi et al., 2017). For example, scour holes of minor or moderate extent might be forming at 239 
bridge foundations throughout the life of the bridge, (Haz-1.1 and Haz-1.2) and then followed by an extensive 240 
flood (Haz-1.3) that causes extensive scouring, debris accumulation and hydraulic forces on the structure. The 241 
restoration strategy might consider retrofitting before (dashed line) or after (solid line) the major event as shown 242 
in Figure 3 (left). The second case described by Figure 3 (right) is the scenario where the major effect occurs 243 
first, and then aftershocks take place in a short or longer period after the mainshock, leading to additional loss 244 
of functionality. The restoration commencement is strongly dependent on a number of factors including the 245 
extent of damage and importance of the asset and potentially influenced by the unpredictable recurrence time. 246 
As an example, after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China, more than 100 major aftershocks were recorded 247 
within 72 hours and more than 40,000 aftershocks of variable magnitudes occurred within 6 months after the 248 
mainshock (Zhang et al., 2013). Among others, the effects of mainshock-aftershocks in the response and 249 
fragility of infrastructure have been studied by Dong and Frangopol (2015) and Ghosh et al. (2015) for bridges, 250 
Zhang et al. (2013) in case of gravity dams, and Li et al., (2014) for steel structures. Iervolino et al. (2015) 251 
formulated a stochastic process to describe the occurrences of aftershocks and their effect on cumulative 252 
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structural damage. To this end, Suzuki et al. (2017) developed state-dependent fragility curves for steel frames 253 
based on numerical modelling, calibrated with shake table tests. The fragility of the damaged structure due to 254 
mainshock was assessed through a back-to-back IDA using a sequence of ground motions. Kumar and Gardoni 255 
(2011) considered cumulative seismic damage in the fragility of RC bridge columns based on a probabilistic 256 
model that computes the degraded deformation capacity of the columns as a function of cumulative low-cycle 257 
fatigue damage incurred in past earthquakes. More recently, Balomenos and Padgett (2017) analysed the 258 
fragility of wharfs subjected to hurricane-induced storm surge and wave loading. 259 
 260 
Figure 3. Realistic restoration strategies for correlated or independent hazards of the same nature including sequence of 261 
minor damage(s) before the major hazard effect (left) and sequence of a major hazard followed by aftershock(s) of lower 262 
intensity (right). 263 
2.2 Resilience framework 264 
A resilience framework is proposed for evaluating losses and resilience of critical infrastructure assets under 265 
multiple hazard scenarios including common cases, which are reflecting in the proposed classification of Section 266 
2.1, i.e. (1) the asset is fully restored after the occurrence of Haz-1 and hence when Haz-2 strikes the asset is at 267 
each full capacity, (2) the loss of functionality due to Haz-1 is partially restored or (3) remains until Haz-2 268 
occurs. This framework encapsulates redundancy and resourcefulness, i.e. (i) the asset robustness to hazard 269 
actions for well-defined critical infrastructure, based on realistic fragility curves or surfaces, and (ii) the rapidity 270 
of the recovery after the occurrence of the minor, moderate, major or complete damage, based on realistic 271 
reinstatement and restoration functions for the infrastructure assets. The above framework is made adaptive to 272 
facilitate timely and cost-efficient management for allocating the resources reasonably and enabling adjustments 273 
to the initiation and the type of restoration, the later depending on the hazard(s). This is reflected in the 274 
reinstatement and restoration functions, according to the stakeholder requirements and the loss of functionality 275 
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after an individual or multiple hazard events. This adaptive approach accounts for the fact that mitigation 276 
measures are not always efficient across different hazards as it is further explained below. Furthermore, this 277 
approach takes into account the sequence of hazards, and its corresponding impact on the restoration models, 278 
taking into account explicitly the time of initiation of the restoration for each hazard considered. The framework 279 
consists of four main steps (Figure 4), each described in a subsection and further explained in Figure 5. 280 
i) Multi-hazard analysis 281 
This analysis aims to define the scenario of hazardous events at a site to be considered for resilience assessment. 282 
Each hazard can be described through an intensity measure (IM), which quantifies the potential of the event to 283 
have an effect on the environment and on the engineering system, and by a series of actions through which it 284 
manifests. For example, in the case of floods affecting bridges, the intensity measure could be the water 285 
discharge and the actions could include scouring, debris impact, buoyancy, and hydrodynamic forces (Tubaldi 286 
et al., 2017). In the case of seismic hazard, the hazard intensity can be described by the peak ground acceleration 287 
or the spectral acceleration for the fundamental period of the structural system, which is usually better correlated 288 
to structural damage. The action can be described by selecting a set of ground motions scaled to the same 289 
intensity level. Usually, hazard curves are developed to describe the probability of exceedance as a function of 290 
the intensity measure used to characterize the hazard. The description of the hazard is completed by an 291 
occurrence model. The homogeneous Poisson distribution is commonly used to describe the occurrence of 292 
natural events in time (Ouyang et al., 2012), though more complex, non-homogeneous models are available, 293 
e.g. renewal process for earthquakes (Takahashi et al., 2004; Yeo and Cornell, 2009). 294 
In the case of independent hazard events, e.g. earthquake and floods, hazard curves can be developed separately 295 
for each hazard (e.g. Yilmaz et al., 2016). In the case of correlated events, joint distributions need to be assigned 296 
to the intensities of the two hazards (e.g. Ming et al., 2015). In the case of cascading events, the probability 297 
distribution of the intensity of the second event conditional to the occurrence of the first event of a given 298 
intensity should be considered (Marzocchi et al., 2012). In many cases, the hazard rates for the second event are 299 
not constant over time and depend heavily on the number of days elapsed since the first event. This is the case 300 
for example of mainshock-aftershock sequences, where the aftershock occurrence rates are significantly 301 
Accepted manuscript: Argyroudis SA, Mitoulis SA, Hofer L, Zanini MA, Tubaldi E, Frangopol DM (2020). Resilience assessment 
framework for critical infrastructure in a multi-hazard environment. Science of the Total Environment, 714, 136854. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.136854         13  
influenced by the magnitude of the mainshock and tend to decrease with the increase of time. In the resilience 302 
assessment of spatially distributed systems, both the temporal and the spatial relationships of multiple hazards 303 
are important (Kong and Simonovic, 2019). 304 
The proposed framework considers a scenario-based approach in the sense that hazard events with a pre-fixed 305 
intensity (or return period) are assumed to occur at specific times during the service life of the infrastructure. It 306 
is noteworthy that recent frameworks have been proposed that allow a comprehensive, life-cycle assessment of 307 
the resilience of infrastructure, by taking into account all the possible events that may affect the system during 308 
the design lifetime (Yang and Frangopol, 2018). 309 
ii) Physical vulnerability models 310 
Physical damage is commonly described through fragility functions (see graphs C and D in Figure 5 for 311 
individual hazards), which give the probability that the asset exceeds an undesirable limit state for a given 312 
intensity of the hazard event to which the asset is subjected, or vulnerability functions, which describe the losses 313 
of an asset as a function of environmental/hazard actions as per step i. These functions can be generated based 314 
on numerical simulations, empirical data, or expert judgement (see also Section 1.1). The numerical fragility 315 
functions are usually built via finite element analyses of the asset under various intensity levels of the hazard. 316 
This requires the development of advanced numerical models for critical hazard scenarios, accurately describing 317 
the assets’ geometrical and mechanical behaviour (Argyroudis et al., 2019). The performance of the components 318 
of the asset is measured through Engineering Demand Parameters (EDPs), e.g. drift of bridge columns, 319 
settlements under the pavement or embankment, titling of a retaining wall. These EDPs are strongly correlated 320 
with damage states (DS) for each asset. In the case of multiple hazards (see graph E in Figure 5), state-dependent 321 
fragility models should ideally be made available to describe the asset damage for a given hazard intensity of 322 
the second hazard and a given damage level due to the first hazard. These models can be represented as a 323 
fragility surface, and quite often the parameter describing the damage due to the first hazard event is replaced 324 
by the intensity of the first event (Fereshtehnejad and Shafieezadeh, 2016; Martin et al., 2019). When such 325 
models are not available, fragility assessment can be based on engineering judgment by adjusting the fragility 326 
Accepted manuscript: Argyroudis SA, Mitoulis SA, Hofer L, Zanini MA, Tubaldi E, Frangopol DM (2020). Resilience assessment 
framework for critical infrastructure in a multi-hazard environment. Science of the Total Environment, 714, 136854. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.136854         14  
functions of the intact structure. This may entail either reducing the asset capacity or increasing its damage 327 
probability due to the preceding damaging event. 328 
Different fragility models are formulated depending on the nature and sequence of hazards. Usually, a two-329 
parameter lognormal function is used to describe the fragility of the component or of a system under a single 330 
hazard. The probability of exceeding a particular damage state, DSi, for a given level IM=im of the hazard 331 
intensity (e.g. peak ground acceleration for earthquake or peak flow discharge for flood hazard) can be expressed 332 
as per Equation 1: 333 
𝑃(𝐷𝑆 ≥ 𝐷𝑆&|𝐼𝑀 = 𝑖𝑚) = Φ/0123453 673 8        (Equation 1) 334 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function; 𝜃& denotes the median value of the intensity 335 
required to cause the ith damage state, and βi denotes the logarithmic standard deviation. It is noteworthy that  𝜃& 336 
and βi generally differ for each damage state. The state-dependent fragility curves are also often assumed to 337 
follow a lognormal distribution, with the median value and the lognormal standard deviation depending on both 338 
the damage accumulated during the previous event and the intensity of the second hazard event. 339 
In general, vulnerability models for multiple hazards are limited and representative examples from the literature 340 
are given in Section 2.1. Adaptive fragility functions account for changes of the asset through its lifecycle, such 341 
as (a) Improvements, e.g. rip-rap for scour protection or jacketing of columns for seismic retrofitting (e.g. 342 
Padgett and DesRoches, 2009). (b) Deterioration effects, e.g. ageing effects, such as change of soil material 343 
properties due to water content and precipitation history, or corrosion of steel reinforcement (e.g. Argyroudis et 344 
al., 2017; Zhong et al., 2012). Changes in hazard intensity and frequency due to climate change (Yang and 345 
Frangopol, 2019a, 2019b) can be also critical in the fragility and resilience assessment (Dong and Frangopol, 346 
2016). (c) Cumulation of damage under repeated events of the same nature (e.g. Ghosh et al., 2015; Iervolino 347 
et al., 2016, Tubaldi et al., 2017). In the latter case, the fragility model should account for the reduction in the 348 
capacity and functionality of the asset due to the first hazard effect, e.g. the fragility of a damaged bridge after 349 
a mainshock earthquake should be shifted to account for the loss in its capacity, thus, aftershocks will strike the 350 
affected bridge, not the original one. Hence, Figure 5D reflects a state-dependent fragility surface in this case. 351 
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The latter statement is also valid for the case where a cascade of hazards emanating from the same cause, but 352 
having different impacts occurs, e.g. a tsunami or landslide following a major earthquake. Similarly, the fragility 353 
functions of the affected assets should be adjusted to account for Haz-1, because no time is given for 354 
intermediate restoration (e.g. Fotopoulou and Pitilakis, 2017 for earthquake-induced landslides). Furthermore, 355 
the mitigation or retrofitting measures for restoring damages against a hazard, e.g. flood and scour protection, 356 
do not necessarily improve equally the robustness against other hazards of different nature, e.g. earthquake. 357 
Ideally, this should be taken into account in the fragility and restoration modelling, as this will affect the 358 
resilience of the asset. 359 
iii) Reinstatement and restoration models 360 
The rapidity of the recovery is measured based on reinstatement (for induced consequences) and restoration (for 361 
asset damage) models. Reinstatement models provide an estimate of the time required to recover the 362 
functionality of an asset after a hazard event, as for example opening and clean-up of a road or railroad, 363 
considering natural processes, e.g. surface runoff of rainwater or melting of ice/snow, or intervention actions, 364 
e.g. removal of debris or drainage of water (see Figure 5F and 5G for individual hazards). Restoration models 365 
correlate the recovery time with the functionality reached for a given damage state (see Section 1.1) and they 366 
follow linear, stochastic or stepwise (see Figure 5H and 5I for individual hazards) formulation (e.g. HAZUS-367 
MH, 2011; Bocchini et al., 2012b). Both reinstatement and restoration models are based on previous 368 
observations and expert elicitations and should account for the extent of the hazard, the type of asset, the 369 
available resources and current practices, and the sequence or cascade of hazards, e.g. flood followed by a debris 370 
flow. Depending on the nature of the hazards and their impact on the infrastructure, e.g. loss of functionality, 371 
the restoration may have temporal variations changing with the strategy and available resources of the owners 372 
or stakeholders as described in Section 2.1. To this respect, probabilistic restoration functions considering the 373 
uncertainties in the restoration process can be used (Karamlou et al., 2017; Decò et al., 2013). An important 374 
aspect of the restoration models is the idle or lag in the restoration commencement, including emergency 375 
response, inspection and condition assessment, site investigation, structural and foundation evaluation, design 376 
of measures, and organisational barriers (Mitoulis et al., 2019). The accumulation of damage due to multiple 377 
hazard events, i.e. without repairing the damage due to previous events, results to longer reinstatement and 378 
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restoration times as shown for example in Figure 5J and 5K, for minor or moderate damage due to Haz-1, 379 
followed by minor, moderate or extensive damage due to Haz-2. The restoration time for complete damage due 380 
to a combination of hazards is expected to be similar to the time needed to reconstruct an asset when it is 381 
completely damaged as a result of the first hazard event, i.e. the restoration curves for one and multiple hazards 382 
are the same. The estimation of the recovery time for a combination of induced obstructions (non-structural) 383 
and asset damages (structural) is challenging, e.g. rockfalls on a bridge that has been displaced due to scour of 384 
the foundation, and this modelling would require parametrisation and adjustment of the proposed framework. 385 
 386 
Figure 4. Main steps of the multi-hazard resilience assessment framework (further details given in Figure 5). 387 
(i) Hazard
(ii) Physical vulnerability
(iv) Resilience
IH: Individual hazard 
MH: Multiple hazard 
Fragility curves (IH)
(iii) Recovery
Restoration (IH or MH)
Reinstatement (IH or MH) 
Resilience curve & indices 
(with/without intermediate 
restoration) 
Hazard curves (IH)
Hazard scenarios 
(IH or MH)
Fragility surfaces (MH)
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 388 
Figure 5. Multi-hazard resilience assessment framework including:  389 
(i) hazard analysis, (ii) physical vulnerability, (iii) recovery, and (iv) resilience analysis. 390 
 391 
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 392 
iv) Resilience analysis 393 
This analysis is performed by combining (i) the information on the identified hazards and IMs, (ii) the fragility 394 
functions for the asset at hand, and (iii) the restoration models, aiming to generate the resilience curves (Figure 395 
5L, 5M) and to assess the corresponding resilience indices. The analysis is adaptable to different sequences of 396 
hazards: (1) A series of individual hazard events (Haz-1, Haz-2), where the second hazard occurs after the 397 
consequences of the first hazard have been recovered, i.e. t2i>t1f, corresponding to Figure 5L, including for 398 
example independent hazards of different or same nature within a relatively long period. (2) The second hazard 399 
(Haz-2) occurs without (continuous line in Figure 5M) or partial (dashed line in Figure 5M) damage restoration 400 
after Haz-1, i.e. t2i<t1f, including for example correlated or independent hazards of the same or different nature.  401 
To calculate the resilience of the system, it is useful to split the functionality function 𝑄(𝑡) into two parts. The 402 
first part of 𝑄(𝑡) for the asset subjected to a hazard event with intensity (IM1) can be expressed as per Equation 403 
2 below: 404 
     (Equation 2) 405 
where  is the functionality of the asset subjected to the ith damage state  due to Haz-1, at time t 406 
after the time t0,1 of occurrence of the hazardous event,  is the probability of occurrence of damage 407 
state 	as calculated using the fragility functions of step (ii) for the given IM1 level,  is the number of 408 
possible damage states associated to Haz-1, is the time when full recovery is achieved after the event, and 409 
t0,2 is the time of occurrence of the second hazardous event (Haz-2). 410 
If the second hazardous event occurs after the system has recovered from Haz-1 (t0,2 >tR,1), then the second part 411 
of 𝑄(𝑡) can be expressed as follows: 412 
      (Equation 3) 413 
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where  is the functionality of the asset subjected to the ith damage state  of Haz-2, and 414 
 is the probability of occurrence of damage state  given the intensity of Haz-2. 415 
If Haz-2 occurs during the recovery process after Haz-1 (t0,2 > tR,1), then the expression of the functionality 416 
function becomes more complicated, due to the interaction of the	𝑄(𝑡) due to the two hazardous events, and the 417 
second part of 𝑄(𝑡) can be calculated as follows (Equation 4): 418 
   (Equation 4)  419 
where  is the functionality of the asset at time t that needs to recover from damage  due 420 
to Haz-1 and damage state  due to Haz-2, and is the probability of being in damage 421 
state  for Haz-2, conditional to IM2 and damage state  with respect to Haz-1, at time , i.e. when 422 
Haz-2 strikes the asset. Finally,  represents the number of the possible damage states associated with Haz-423 
2 and  corresponds to the time of complete recovery from both damages (i.e. tR,12 - t0,1 is the duration of 424 
the recovery). The time between the two hazards can be very short, corresponding to successive or concurrent 425 
events, or can refer to longer periods. It is noteworthy that when Haz-2 strikes the asset, some repair works may 426 
have already been undertaken. Thus, the level of damage  at  is likely to be less than the damage at 427 
. The reduction of damage can be assumed to follow the same trend as that of the recovery function, 428 
.  429 
In practice, the functionality function , which is required for computing  according to Equation 430 
3, is expressed as follows (Equation 5):  431 
      (Equation 5) 432 
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where  denotes the recovery from Haz-1, that continues after the occurrence of Haz-2, and 433 
 denotes the functionality losses owed to Haz-2 to the functionality losses, which 434 
are also recovered over time. 435 
 436 
The resilience assessment is commonly based on a resilience index, which is a function of the time-variant 437 
functionality of the infrastructure over the restoration time for the given hazard scenarios (Frangopol and 438 
Bocchini, 2011; Ayyub, 2014; Decò et al., 2013). The final expression of the resilience index is given by the 439 
following equation: 440 
𝑅 = >?@A?B,D ∫ 𝑄(𝑡)𝑑𝑡?@?B,D           (Equation 6) 441 
where th is the investigated time horizon. When the time frame of interest is the time to recover from both 442 
hazards, then th=tR,12, which coincides with tR,2 if the two hazard events are not interacting one with each other. 443 
Since Haz-2 can randomly occur after the occurrence of Haz-1, i.e. at t= t0,2, the resilience index computed 444 
according to Equation 6, becomes itself a random variable with its moments that need to be evaluated for a 445 
complete understanding of the resilience of the asset, i.e. by employing a Monte Carlo approach. 446 
The value of the proposed framework at the asset level is the encapsulation of the loss and recovery process in 447 
one index, which can facilitate the efficient allocation of resources, planning and interventions by the owners, 448 
toward more resilient infrastructure. Thus, it is essential for the owners to define, with the help of engineers, 449 
appropriate thresholds for the resilience indices to expedite the decision-making according to their needs and 450 
priorities. The resilience analysis can be extended on a system level (e.g. highway network), accounting for 451 
other factors toward a well-informed resilience-based decision making (Zanini et al., 2017; Pregnolato et al., 452 
2018; Arrighi et al., 2019; Akiyama et al., 2019). In this context, the prioritisation of recovery measures should 453 
be made on the basis of network analysis, including post-event demand variation during 454 
reinstatement/restoration as well as economic, social and environmental consequences due to physical damage 455 
and functionality losses, e.g. traffic diversions in transport networks or loss of pressure in water systems. 456 
3. Application to a transport infrastructure asset  457 
( )1 1Q t IM
{ }2 02 ,1 ,2 021 , ,i jQ t t DS DS té ù- -ë û
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3.1 Description of the case study 458 
This section illustrates the application of the framework described above to a realistic case study, consisting of 459 
a three-span prestressed concrete bridge, shown in Figure 6, exposed to a sequence of hazard effects (flood and 460 
earthquake), which are independent hazards different in nature (category I in Section 2.1). Although the case 461 
study does not correspond to any real bridge, it is representative of a very common bridge class. This is a typical 462 
fully integral bridge, i.e. has no expansion joints or bearings, with a total length of 101.5m. It has three equal 463 
spans of 33.5m, two piers with shallow underwater foundations and two full-height integral abutments. The 464 
deck is a box girder and has a total width of 13.5m. The height of the abutments is 8.0m, the footing has a 465 
thickness of 1.0m and is 5.5m long. The piers are wall-type sections with dimensions 1.0x4.5m in the 466 
longitudinal and transversal direction respectively and a height of 10.0m. The shallow foundation footings have 467 
a thickness of 1.5m and 3.5m long. The foundation soil is a very stiff clay, classified as ground type B, according 468 
to Eurocode 8-Part 1, while the backfill material is well-compacted sand. For this study, the resilience of the 469 
bridge is analysed under the following hazard scenarios: (i) flood only, i.e. scour of the pier on the right, (ii) 470 
seismic shaking only, and (iii) flood event followed by earthquake event, considering the temporal variability 471 
of the hazard sequences. 472 
3.2 Fragility and functionality loss functions for individual and multiple hazards 473 
The seismic vulnerability of the bridge has been studied by Argyroudis et al. (2018) based on 2D coupled non-474 
linear dynamic analysis of a numerical model that contained the bridge, the two backfills and the foundation 475 
soil. The bridge is a high capacity frame structure, and hence, was found to have low vulnerability to seismic 476 
shaking. Thus, the collapse of the bridge has a very low probability and may occur only for high levels of 477 
seismic intensity. No damage or minor damage is expected on the piers and the prestressed deck, while more 478 
significant damage is expected to be of geotechnical nature and is concentrated on the backfill-abutment-wing 479 
walls system. Potential failure modes, due to ground shaking, include settlement of the backfill soil, permanent 480 
dislocations of the bridge and its foundations and hence, residual stresses within the abutment, the piers and the 481 
deck, formation of the bump-at-the-end-of-the-bridge, cracking of the approach slab, excessive soil pressures 482 
causing cracking of the abutment, approach slab and wing walls (Elgamal et al., 2008; Murphy et al., 2018).  483 
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The finite element model and the procedure employed to develop the numerical fragility curves for the bridge 484 
accounting for the effects of flood-induced scour and earthquake loading is described in detail in Argyroudis et 485 
al., (2019). Initially, dry conditions were considered for the soil, and then the water table level was gradually 486 
raised to 3.0m above the ground surface to simulate flooding conditions. Flooding was accounted for by 487 
modifying the properties of the saturated soil layers, while a calibration procedure was followed to account for 488 
the dependency of stiffness and damping of the foundation soil on its primary shear strain level during the 489 
earthquake. Scour was simulated by removing the soil elements within the scour hole (Tubaldi et al. 2018). 490 
Different levels of the scour depth at the foundation of the piers were considered, corresponding to 1.0Df, 1.5Df 491 
and 2.0Df, where Df =2.5m is the foundation depth. Five real acceleration time histories from earthquakes 492 
recorded on rock or very stiff soil were selected as outcrop motion, scaled to different intensity levels for the 493 
dynamic analyses. The seismic excitations were induced separately for each scour depth to simulate the 494 
combination of the two hazards. The structural damage was defined based on the exceedance of the cracking 495 
and yielding moments for critical sections of the deck, pier and abutment. The geotechnical damage was defined 496 
based on the maximum permanent ground deformation of the backfill behind the abutment and the foundation 497 
of the pier. The fragility of the entire bridge was then extracted assuming a series connection between 498 
components (Stefanidou and Kappos, 2017), considering the associated uncertainties. 499 
The parameters of the lognormal fragility functions, i.e. median intensity measure (IM) and lognormal standard 500 
deviation, for the different damage states are shown in Table 2, in terms of scour depth (Sc) for flood (FL) and 501 
PGA for earthquake (EQ) hazard. The fragility parameters for flood only are largely based on limited numerical 502 
analysis without taking into account 3D effects and also contain engineering judgement, to cover the particular 503 
needs of this paper. 504 
Table 2. Fragility function parameters (median and lognormal standard deviation) of the case study bridge exposed to 505 
flood (FL), earthquake (EQ) and combination (FL+EQ). 506 
Hazard à FL EQ FL+EQ (Sc=1.0Df) 
FL+EQ 
(Sc=1.5Df) 
FL+EQ 
(Sc=2.0Df) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Damage State Median Sc [m] Median PGA [g] 
Minor 2.00 0.32 0.09 0.07 0.01 
Moderate 3.50 0.60 0.58 0.16 0.02 
Extensive 5.00 1.10 1.05 0.30 0.03 
Complete 6.50 1.60 1.56 0.40 0.06 
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Lognormal 
standard deviation 0.80 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 
 507 
Figure 6. The case study on a highway bridge exposed to flood induced scour (Haz-1) and earthquake 508 
excitation (Haz-2). 509 
3.3 Restoration functions for individual and multiple hazards 510 
Reliable restoration models can only be developed based on real asset performances, validated recorded data 511 
and evidence and input from experts, e.g. elicitation approaches with participation from owners, stakeholders, 512 
and engineers. Secondarily, the availability of materials and resources, labour preparedness, and administration 513 
reaction to catastrophes, influence the restoration. For this paper, the repair time for each hazard and damage 514 
state has been defined based on engineering judgement considering realistic construction practices and 515 
uncertainties. The selection of the restoration time was made on the basis of the bridge typology and geometry, 516 
as well as the failure modes considered in the fragility analysis. A detailed presentation of the failure modes and 517 
restoration tasks for each damage state is shown in Figures 7 and 8, for flood and earthquake hazards. The 518 
common restoration tasks include engineering, administration and structural health monitoring tasks, while the 519 
restoration works are differentiated into structural and geotechnical. The relatively short restoration time for 520 
complete damage due to seismic shaking only is related to the low vulnerability of the specific bridge type -521 
integral and robust, whilst the expected damage is mainly of geotechnical nature and is concentrated on the 522 
backfill-abutment-wing walls system, which is easily restored. The restoration times for the individual and the 523 
combined hazards are summarized in Table 3, where a mean and standard deviation are provided assuming that 524 
the restoration functions follow a normal distribution. Idle time is also considered, corresponding to the time 525 
from the occurrence of the event to the commencement of the restoration works.  526 
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For the combined hazards, the restoration time is defined assuming that the restoration commences after the 527 
occurrence of the second hazard, i.e. earthquake, without having taken any restoration measures after the 528 
occurrence of minor or moderate damage due to the first hazard, i.e. flood, as per Figure 1 (right). A pragmatic 529 
approach for the restoration models should consider that significant damage will be dealt with by the owner, 530 
and hence, it was considered to be unrealistic to have a bridge extensively or completely damaged after a flood 531 
(Haz-1), without any measures being taken prior to the earthquake (Haz-2). Thus, Figure 1 (left) is more likely 532 
to illustrate the case where Haz-1, i.e. flood, causes extensive or complete damage, in which case the asset will 533 
be restored partially or fully. In this case, a reasonable approach is to reconstruct the fragility functions of the 534 
restored bridge for the second hazard, i.e. earthquake, as the asset is now expected to respond differently from 535 
the initial pre-flood undisturbed asset. For this research, it was considered that the fully restored bridge has the 536 
same performance as the undisturbed bridge, an assumption that is subject to further research. Also, the 537 
resilience curves are based on the assumption that the functionality of the bridge is only affected by the portion 538 
of the functionality that has been lost and not by the nature of the hazard. Thus, for example, a 20% loss of 539 
functionality due to flood followed by a 10% loss of functionality due to an earthquake, means a total loss of 540 
functionality of 30%. Nevertheless, the restoration times are differentiated based on the nature of the hazards. 541 
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 542 
Figure 7. Damage states and restoration tasks for local scour effects on bridge pier shallow foundation. 543 
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Figure 8. Damage states and restoration tasks for seismic effects on a bridge with shallow foundations. 545 
Table 3. Parameters of the restoration functions (mean time and standard deviation) for the case study bridge exposed to 546 
flood (FL), earthquake (EQ) and combined (FL+EQ) hazards. 547 
Hazard: FL EQ 
Damage state 
Mean 
restoration 
time 
[days] 
Standard 
deviation 
[days] 
Idle time 
[days] 
Mean 
restoration 
time 
[days] 
Standard 
deviation 
[days] 
Idle time 
[days] 
Minor 7 8.4 3.5 2 2.4 3.5 
Moderate 15 13.5 7.5 7 6.3 7.5 
Extensive 30 18 15 14 8.4 15 
Complete 200 80 100 45 18 1000 
 548 
Hazard: FL+EQ 
Scour Damage state (EQ) 
Mean 
restoration 
time [days] 
Standard 
deviation 
[days] 
Idle time 
[days] 
Minor 
Sc = 1.0 Df 
Minor 5 5 1 
Moderate 10 9 3 
Extensive 20 14 12 
Complete 50 16 24 
Moderate 
Sc = 1.5 Df 
Minor 10 10 2 
Moderate 20 18 6 
Extensive 40 28 24 
Complete 80 32 48 
Extensive 
Sc = 2.0 Df 
Minor 30 30 6 
Moderate 60 54 18 
Extensive 100 70 60 
Complete 160 64 96 
Complete Minor / Moderate / Extensive / Complete 200 80 100 
 549 
3.4 Modelling and quantification of resilience and results 550 
This section contains the results of the analyses performed to the case study previously illustrated, to highlight 551 
the impact of consecutive hazards, i.e. flood and earthquake events, on the final bridge resilience index. For this 552 
application and all the cases presented herein, it was assumed that flood hazard occurs first (Haz-1) and 553 
earthquake second (Haz-2). Moreover, the earthquake event is assumed to happen before (as shown with the 554 
dashed line in Figure 1, right) or after (as shown in Figure 1, left) the end of the recovery process following a 555 
flood. All cases are investigated by assuming three different scour levels, 1.0 Df, 1.5 Df, and 2.0 Df and five 556 
levels of peak ground acceleration (PGA), 0.2g, 0.4g, 0.8g, 1.2g and 1.6g. The bridge resilience curves Q(t) 557 
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have been computed according to equations 2 and 3 provided in Section 2.2, and the resilience index R has been 558 
calculated based on Equation 6.  559 
Figure 9 shows the results of the first case in which seismic scenarios of different magnitude are considered to 560 
occur after the complete bridge recovery from Haz-1 (t02 = th1). In all cases, namely 1.0 Df, 1.5 Df and 2.0 Df, 561 
the time needed for recovering from the flood is significantly higher than the time for the full restoration for 562 
any PGA level as reflected in the restoration tasks of Figures 7 and 8 and the restoration time described in Table 563 
3. However, the loss of functionality due to Haz-1 is limited when compared to the one caused by the higher 564 
PGA levels. In general, the resilience of the bridge decreases with increasing levels of scouring and PGA.  565 
 566 
567 
 568 
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Figure 9. Resilience curves for the case that Haz-2 (EQ at PGA levels equal to 0.2. 0.4, 0.8, 1.2 and 1.6 g) occurs after 569 
the total recovery from Haz-1: a) Sc = 1.0 Df, b) Sc = 1.5 Df, and c) Sc = 2.0 Df. 570 
The second case considered corresponds to the occurrence of Haz-2 when the recovery from the previous 571 
calamitous event is still ongoing (t0,2 < tR,1). This second case is more complex than the first since the effect on 572 
the total bridge recovery is strongly influenced by the temporal occurrence of the seismic event. Since the time 573 
of occurrence of Haz-2 is a random variable (RV), the restoration process and the resilience index R itself 574 
becomes random. For computing the distribution of R, the time of occurrence of Haz-2 has been uniformly 575 
sampled in the time interval between the occurrence of Haz-1 and the time of total recovery from Haz-1. Figure 576 
10 describes the steps of the numerical simulation framework, which has been developed in Matlab (2017) on 577 
the basis of a Monte Carlo approach. In particular, 15,000 recovery curves have been sampled for each 578 
combination of Df and PGA, ensuring precision of the estimator of 0.02. Regarding the parameters for the 579 
damage state-dependent fragilities, these have been estimated based on a linear interpolation over time between 580 
two extreme values for the following cases: (a) the case of FL+EQ without any intermediate restoration 581 
(columns 4, 5, 6 in Table 2), which is the lower bound, and (b) the case of EQ only (column 3 in Table 2), which 582 
is the upper bound. A similar approach was adopted for the restoration function parameters, i.e. interpolating 583 
the corresponding mean restoration time, between the lower (FL+EQ) and the upper (EQ) bounds.  584 
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Figure 10. Numerical simulation framework developed in Matlab (2017) including the steps for the resilience 586 
assessment, for the case where Haz-2 occurs during the recovery from the previous calamitous event (Haz-1). 587 
Figure 11 shows the effects of five different levels of PGA, randomly occurring during the recovery from Haz-588 
1. In particular, in the case with the lower level of PGA, i.e. 0.2 g, a minor shaking soon after the flood is 589 
sufficient for dropping the bridge functionality to zero. This is caused by a combination of a low post-flood 590 
initial functionality and high bridge seismic vulnerability due to the short time between the two hazards 591 
occurrence. For all five cases, the effect of the earthquake on the resilience lowers when it occurs a long time 592 
after the occurrence of the previous Haz-1, and this is clearly shown by the grey curves representing the entire 593 
sampled recovery curves. For high PGA levels, greater than 0.8 g, the residual functionality drops to zero even 594 
when the earthquake occurs almost at the end of the restoration process. Figure 12 shows the second case in 595 
which an earthquake occurs after a flood event able to cause a scour equal to 1.5 Df. With a scour of 1.5 Df, a 596 
PGA equal to 0.2 g, occurring when 35% of the lost functionality is recovered, can cause a complete loss of the 597 
bridge functionality. Higher levels of PGA can significantly compromise the bridge functionality even when 598 
occurring for an intermediate level of recovered functionality. Figure 13 shows the case in which a significant 599 
flood occurs, causing a scour of 2.0 Df. In this case, the bridge’s structural capacity is severely compromised 600 
and also lower values of PGA are sufficient for causing an extensive or complete damage state. This case 601 
represents the worst-case scenario, in which there is a significant bridge functionality drop due to Haz-1, 602 
together with a significant increase of the seismic vulnerability and of the recovery time also after the 603 
earthquake. Even in this case, the time of occurrence of Haz-2 plays an important role; indeed, the worst 604 
situation is when there is the rapid succession of the two hazards, while the less impacting is when Haz-2 occurs 605 
at the end of the recovery process from Haz-1.  606 
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 608 
609 
610 
611 
 612 
Figure 11. Resilience curves for the case that Haz-2 (EQ at PGA levels 0.2. 0.4, 0.8, 1.2, and 1.6 g) occurs during the 613 
recovery phase after Haz-1 (FL), with Sc = 1Df. The grey lines in the plots at the left correspond to the 15,000 recovery 614 
curves sampled in the time interval between the occurrence of Haz-1 and the total recovery from Haz-1. μR and δR in the 615 
plots (right), correspond to the central value and the coefficient of variation of the estimated resilience indices.  616 
 617 
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619 
620 
621 
 622 
Figure 12. Resilience curves for the case that Haz-2 (EQ at PGA levels 0.2. 0.4, 0.8, 1.2, and 1.6 g) occurs during the 623 
recovery phase after Haz-1 (FL), with Sc = 1.5 Df. The grey lines in the plots at the left correspond to the 15,000 624 
recovery curves sampled in the time interval between the occurrence of Haz-1 and the total recovery from Haz-1. μR and 625 
δR in the plots (right), correspond to the central value and the coefficient of variation of the estimated resilience indices. 626 
 627 
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 632 
Figure 13. Resilience curves for the case that Haz-2 (EQ at PGA levels 0.2. 0.4, 0.8, 1.2, and 1.6 g) occurs during the 633 
recovery phase after Haz-1 (FL), with Sc = 2.0 Df. The grey lines in the plots at the left correspond to the 15,000 634 
recovery curves sampled in the time interval between the occurrence of Haz-1 and the total recovery from Haz-1. μR and 635 
δR in the plots (right), correspond to the central value and the coefficient of variation of the estimated resilience indices. 636 
 637 
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Figure 14 illustrates the joint influence of the levels of scour and PGA on the resilience index. In particular, the 638 
effect of the earthquake is more relevant when occurs with a higher level of scour. Furthermore, the evaluation 639 
of the entire resilience index distribution allows quantifying the uncertainty correlated to the occurrence of Haz-640 
2 with respect to Haz-1. This has been done by introducing the coefficient of variation 𝛿 = 𝜎 𝜇⁄ , usually 641 
preferred to the common variance (or standard deviation) since the measure of variability is more meaningful if 642 
measured relative to the central value μ, and 𝛿 is always positive. Besides, the distribution of R allows a 643 
reliability-based assessment of bridge resilience. Bounds on the resilience indexes in Figure 13, show that the 644 
estimation of R is more uncertain for increasing levels of scour and PGA. For this particular case study, it was 645 
found that the resilience index R will obtain a maximum value of 0.77 if the two hazards (FL & EQ) are 646 
considered independent, whereas the same index yielded a value of 0.65 ± 0.07 when EQ event occurred during 647 
the restoration after FL. The latter corresponds to the severe scenario of maximum scour depth and PGA 648 
intensity, while this error is minimised for smaller intensities of the two hazards. The relatively high values of 649 
R even for severe earthquake intensities are due to the high robustness of this specific bridge. Results show the 650 
need for probabilistic approaches for the resilience assessment, especially for combined extreme events, for 651 
which the temporal occurrence can play a key role. 652 
  653 
Figure 14. Comparison between resulting resilience indexes for all the investigated scenarios: a) FL (Sc = 1 Df) +EQ, b) 654 
FL (Sc = 1.5 Df) + EQ, b) FL (Sc = 2.0 Df) + EQ. In the black curve, EQ (Haz-2) occurs after the complete restoration of 655 
FL (Haz-1) induced damages. In the green, blue and red curves, EQ occurs during the restoration of FL induced 656 
damages.  657 
Finally, Figure 15 shows the behaviour of the expected value of R, E[R], and the coefficient of variation, 𝛿(𝑅), 658 
as a function of the scour Df and the shaking level. For this specific case study, the trend of the resilience index 659 
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can be well represented by a plane, where the expected R values decrease for increasing Sc and PGA. Regarding 660 𝛿, the variable that most affects the coefficient of variation is the level of scour.  661 
 662 
Figure 15. Behaviour of the resilience index, μR, (plots at the top) and the coefficient of variation, 𝛿, (plots at the bottom) 663 
as a function of the scour (Sc) and the shaking level (PGA). 664 
3.5 Roadmap for resilience assessment of critical infrastructure at the network and national scale 665 
The proposed resilience assessment framework has been applied to a highway infrastructure asset, i.e. a river 666 
crossing bridge exposed to flood and earthquake events. However, this approach can be adjusted, extended and 667 
applied to the entire highway infrastructure of a region or a country as per Figure 16, i.e. to a portfolio of critical 668 
highway assets such as bridges, tunnels, embankments, slopes or retaining walls. Likewise, it can be employed 669 
in the resilience evaluation of critical infrastructure, such as hubs, ports, airports, railways, electric power or gas 670 
networks toward community resilience (Ayyub, 2014; Cimellaro et al., 2016). This roadmap in achieving 671 
resiliency in regions, countries or continents, is aligned with international frameworks and policies for disaster 672 
risk reduction, e.g. UNISDR, 2015; NIST, 2016; Rockefeller Foundation, 2019; Lloyd’s Register Foundation, 673 
2019. In this respect, the resilience assessments for single or multi-hazard events at infrastructure scale can be 674 
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utilised by the network operators and owners to prioritise the mitigation measures, including retrofitting and/or 675 
monitoring of critical assets, optimisation of recovery strategies and disaster preparedness, insurance of the 676 
infrastructure against losses from natural and/or human-induced disasters, and planning for extending 677 
infrastructure. Decision making may be based on the resilience assessment, accounting for critical 678 
interdependencies between networks, and other factors, such as socio-political criteria, the impact of 679 
infrastructure failures to businesses, populations and environment (Cimellaro et al., 2010).  680 
 681 
Figure 16. Roadmap of asset-specific resilience-based assessment providing information to network operators and 682 
countries for decision-making in resources allocation. 683 
4. Conclusions 684 
This paper proposes an integrated framework for the resilience assessment of infrastructure assets exposed to 685 
multiple hazards characterized by diverse nature, impact and occurrence time. The framework accounts for (i) 686 
the robustness of the assets to hazard actions, based on realistic fragility functions for individual and multiple 687 
hazards, and (ii) the rapidity of the recovery, based on realistic reinstatement and restoration models after 688 
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individual and multiple hazard events. The framework allows quantifying the impact on the resilience of 689 
alternative restoration strategies following the occurrence of a hazardous event, including the cases of full, 690 
partial and even no restoration. A generalized index is defined to quantify the resilience in a unified way for 691 
different hazard and recovery scenarios. This index can be used to facilitate decision-making and prioritisation 692 
processes by infrastructure owners and operators by maximising the resilience of critical infrastructure based 693 
on efficient risk mitigation and restoration strategies. 694 
The application of the proposed framework is illustrated by considering a realistic case study, consisting of a 695 
multi-span highway bridge exposed to two consecutive hazard scenarios, considering flood-induced scour 696 
followed by an earthquake. Novel contributions include: 1) the identification of representative failure modes for 697 
flood and earthquake hazards, 2) the development of realistic fragility and restoration functions for individual 698 
and combined hazards, and 3) the consideration of appropriate restoration tasks. The resilience models are 699 
developed for multiple hazard scenarios of different intensities, considering the full or partial recovery of the 700 
bridge between the different hazard events and accounting for the uncertainty in the temporal occurrence of the 701 
second hazard. Based on the results of the study, the following conclusions are drawn:  702 
(1) In all cases studied the mean resilience index decreases by increasing the severity of the two hazards and by 703 
reducing the time of occurrence of the second hazard event with respect to the first. 704 
(2) The randomness of the temporal occurrence of the second hazard can introduce significant variability in the 705 
resilience index, which increases by increasing the severity of both hazards. Based on the application on the 706 
bridge, the dispersion of the resilience index was found to be of the order of 8% for relatively low scour hazard 707 
occurrences, e.g. a scour depth of 1.0 Df and low earthquake intensities with a PGA of 0.2 g, as the damages 708 
induced by the hazards are insignificant. The error in the calculation of the resilience index increases 709 
significantly and attained values of 23% for the larger scour depth of 1.5 Df and 33% for the maximum hazard 710 
occurrence of 2.0 Df, in conjunction with high earthquake intensities of 1.2 g.  711 
(3) Assuming that the asset has fully recovered from the first hazard event when the second hazard event occurs, 712 
it results in an overestimation of the resilience index. Thus, multiple hazards occurrences cannot be treated 713 
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independently using simple superimposition of resilience indices. Their interaction has to be accounted and the 714 
resulting effects have to be considered at each stage of the resilience assessment.  715 
Further research should be carried out to validate the restoration models, based on recorded data, evidence and 716 
input from experts, e.g. elicitation approaches, with participation by owners, stakeholders and engineers. Future 717 
work will focus on the deployment of this framework for life-cycle resilience assessment of critical 718 
infrastructure assets and networks, including utilising monitoring techniques in rapid resilience assessments. 719 
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